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Abstract—Passwords are used to secure our daily digital lives.
Some websites on the Internet use a technique called masked
passwords to combat observation attacks (e.g. keyloggers or
shoulder-surfers). This technique requires the users to enter
only a random subset of the characters of their password,
thus preventing an observer to capture the entire password.
However, to verify the individual characters, the password
must be stored as plaintext or reversibly encrypted on the
website’s servers. In this work, we present a method, which
allows storing the users’ passwords in hashed form when using
masked passwords.
1. Introduction
There are many ways a password can fall into the wrong
hands. Among them are observation attacks like keyloggers
and shoulder-surfing. Such attacks capture the input on the
users’ machines with the goal to extract passwords and other
sensitive information (e.g. credit card details). Some web-
sites employ a technique called masked passwords to counter
this threat. These websites require their users to enter only a
randomly chosen subset of the password’s characters instead
of the complete password. Fig. 1 depicts this procedure as
employed on a banking website. Sometimes this technique
is also used in two-factor schemes [1].
Figure 1. A typical login procedure using masked passwords: (1) the user
specifies her/his user name (Id in this example), (2) the user clicks ”Next”
to proceed to the password entry, (3) randomly selected characters of the
password have to be entered (in this example, the first, second, fifth, and
twelfth character). Screenshots from https://aliorbank.pl/hades/do/Login.
While this technique can help to prevent leaking entire
passwords to keyloggers or shoulder-surfers, it requires the
password to be stored either in plain text or reversibly
encrypted (i.e. encrypted with the key being available on
the system). Thus, in case the servers of the website using
masked passwords are compromised or a disgruntled ad-
ministrative employee turns into an insider threat, the users’
passwords are unprotected.
The goal of this work is to provide a method which
allows storing only a hash1 derived from the masked pass-
word, as is best practice for password storage. It is based
on (t, n)-threshold verification [2], an approach using secret
sharing to securely and efficiently store secrets in different
portfolio authentication scenarios. We first describe the gen-
eral ideas of portfolio authentication as well as t-n-threshold
verification and then how we apply these ideas to masked
passwords.
2. Portfolio Authentication
The basic idea of portfolio authentication is regarding
the password as a set of elements (a portfolio). Masked
passwords are one application of portfolio authentication
based on text passwords. Another application of portfo-
lio authentication is increasing the resistance of graphical
recognition-based authentication schemes to naive shoulder-
surfing attacks [3].
Generally speaking, in portfolio authentication a pass-
word P of length n is represented as P = {e1, e2, . . . , en}.
During each authentication attempt the user enters only a
random subset P ′ ⊆ P of these elements. We use the
nomenclature of [2] and denote a subset P ′ as authorised if it
has at least t elements, where the parameter t is set depend-
ing on the desired security properties. Thereby, the elements
can have any form or even different forms (e.g. textual
characters/strings, images, electronic certificates, etc.). Port-
folio authentication usually follows a challenge-response
procedure. To authenticate, the user is challenged by the
system to provide a specific authorised subset.
1. Note that when we refer to hashes or hashing in this work, we always
assume the use of a secure KDF (e.g. PBKDF2-SHA256, scrypt, Argon2,
etc.) with appropriate configurations, salts and where appropriate peppers.
3. (t, n)-threshold Verification
One challenge with portfolio authentication is to verify
in a secure and efficient manner whether the user’s input
represents an authorised subset P ′ of the password. This
challenge is addressed by (t, n)-threshold verification. It
uses Blakley (t, n)-threshold secret sharing [4] and key
derivation functions (KDF) to derive the same secret from
all authorised subsets. Blakley secret sharing is based on
hyperplane geometry. Its internal structure is a linear system
of equations Mx = y, where x is a secret t-dimensional
point, y the n-dimensional vector of shares and M holds
randomly chosen parameters that do not need to be kept
secret. The details are left out here due to space constraints,
but can be found in [2].
4. Applying (t, n)-threshold Verification to
Masked Passwords
Fig. 2 depicts the procedure, when applying (t, n)-
threshold verification to masked passwords. We first describe
the enrolment and then the authentication and verification.
4.1. Enrolment
First, the textual password is split up into its characters
ci∈{1,2,...,|P |} and each character ci is concatenated with its
index i in the password to create the elements ei. This step
ensures, that in order to guess a share, not only the right
character, but also its correct position in the password is
required. Following the procedure of (t, n)-threshold verifi-
cation, these elements are hashed to generate the shares yi.
Thereafter, a random secret x is chosen and its hash s stored
for later verification. Finally, the matrix M is generated
using the method described in [2] and stored alongside the
hash s and the length of the password.
4.2. Authentication and Verification
To authenticate a user, the system generates a challenge
by randomly selecting t positions i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, where
n = |P |. This challenge is displayed to the user who has
to enter the respective characters ci of the password. Then,
analogously to the enrolment, the pair of ci (supplied by
the user) and the respective i (supplied by the server) are
concatenated and hashed on the server to derive the shares
y′i. These shares are then used to solve the linear system of
equations Mx′ = y′ for x′. In the last step, it is verified that
the hash of x′ matches the previously stored s. If the two
hashes match, the user has entered the correct authorised
subset and the authentication attempt is successful.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we apply (t, n)-threshold verification to
masked passwords. Thereby, we increase the server-side
strength of the technique. While the guessing resistance is
Figure 2. Enrolment and verification procedures, when applying (t, n)-
threshold verification to masked passwords: (1) text password is split up
into its characters, (2) characters are concatenated with their index, (3) each
element is hashed to create the vector of shares y, (4) secret point x is
chosen at random, (5) matrix M is generated as described in [2], (6) x is
hashed to generate the verification information, (7) the elements required
for verification are stored, (8) challenge is generated by choosing t indices
in the password at random, (9) user responds to the challenge with the
respective characters and the server concatenates the respective indices to
the characters and hashes the pair to generate the shares y′, (10) linear
system of equations Mx′ = y′ is solved for x′, (11) x′ is hashed, (12)
verification whether KDF(x′)=s is performed.
determined by the parameter t (any attacker has to guess
only t elements of the password correctly) the use of our
proposal in conjunction with modern password hashing
functions can greatly increase the cost for an attacker.
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